Houthi gains, a disabled oil pipeline, refinery attacks and shrinking export capacity have exposed Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. The regional war is also pushing Riyadh deeper into a U.S. security network built around Israeli intelligence and military power.
Saudi Arabia is seeking Israeli intelligence against Yemen’s Houthis at the same time its oil system is absorbing one blow after another. The unusual relationship is developing through U.S. Central Command, giving Riyadh access to Israeli intelligence without formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The talks come as Houthi forces gain territory, attack Saudi energy facilities and threaten shipping around the Red Sea. (The Jerusalem Post, September 15, 2026; Ynet News, September 15, 2026)
The kingdom’s East West oil pipeline is shut after a drone attack, and Houthi forces have seized positions around the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Saudi Aramco facilities have faced repeated attacks, and Saudi crude supply has fallen to its lowest level in more than three decades. The pipeline had become one of Saudi Arabia’s main ways to move oil around disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Its shutdown removes part of the backup system the kingdom spent decades building. (Reuters, September 11, 2026; Associated Press, September 15, 2026)
Saudi Arabia can still export oil, but the routes are becoming harder to use at the same time the world has less room for another supply shock. The East West Pipeline, Red Sea terminals and Saudi storage were supposed to provide alternatives when problems hit the Persian Gulf. Attacks are now reaching those alternatives too. The result is a Saudi security problem that has become a much larger threat to the global energy market. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Al Jazeera, September 14, 2026)
Saudi Arabia’s Search for Help Reaches Israel
Saudi Arabia and Israel have held discussions through CENTCOM about Israeli intelligence assistance against the Houthis, according to several regional reports. The talks have focused on information that could help Riyadh identify Houthi military positions, weapons infrastructure and possible operational plans. Ynet reported that Israeli intelligence assistance is already reaching Saudi Arabia through CENTCOM and does not involve direct Israeli participation in combat. (The Jerusalem Post, September 15, 2026; Ynet News, September 15, 2026; i24NEWS, September 15, 2026)
A source familiar with the discussions told The Jerusalem Post, “There were good discussions.” The contacts followed meetings involving CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The arrangement allows Saudi Arabia to seek Israeli help through an American military channel rather than publicly establish direct military cooperation with Israel. (The Jerusalem Post, September 15, 2026)
The request comes as Riyadh has sought more outside assistance against the Houthis. Ynet reported that Mohammed bin Salman asked President Donald Trump to order American strikes after Houthi gains and attacks against Saudi territory. Trump rejected the request, but U.S. officials said Washington would provide intelligence and help Saudi forces identify targets. Saudi Arabia has also asked Britain for help defending oil infrastructure and confronting the Houthi threat around Bab el Mandeb. (Ynet News, September 15, 2026; The Jerusalem Post, September 15, 2026)
The Saudi contacts with Israel became more significant after a private military meeting in Germany organized by Cooper. Military chiefs from the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt attended. CENTCOM said the participants discussed greater security cooperation in the Middle East. The gathering gave Israeli and Saudi military leaders another channel to discuss regional threats under American sponsorship. (Axios, September 15, 2026)
For Riyadh, CENTCOM provides political distance from Israel at a moment when security needs are pulling the countries closer together. For Israel, the system provides another route into Gulf military planning without waiting for a Saudi normalization agreement. The relationship is moving through intelligence and military channels faster than the diplomatic process surrounding it. Saudi officials still publicly connect formal normalization with Israel to movement on the Israeli Palestinian conflict. (The Jerusalem Post, September 15, 2026)
Israel Has Already Become Part of Gulf Defense
The Saudi talks follow a much deeper military relationship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates during the Iran war. Israel secretly sent an Iron Dome air defense battery to the UAE, along with Israeli personnel to operate it, after Iranian missile and drone attacks. Israeli officials said the system intercepted dozens of Iranian missiles. Israel also provided the Emirates with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance. (Axios, April 26, 2026)
The cooperation went beyond air defense. Israeli aircraft struck short range missile positions in southern Iran that officials said could have threatened the UAE and other Gulf states. The arrangement showed how quickly political barriers could weaken when Gulf governments faced direct military pressure. It also created a model for the intelligence relationship now being discussed between Israel and Saudi Arabia. (Axios, April 26, 2026)
Tareq al Otaiba, a former official with the UAE National Security Council, described the change in clear terms. “Primarily, the United States and Israel have proved to be true allies by offering support through extensive military aid, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic backing.” His comments reflected the degree to which the Iran war changed security calculations inside the Emirates. (Axios, April 26, 2026)
Saudi Arabia has not reached the same level of open cooperation. The current Saudi discussions center on intelligence rather than Israeli troops or an Israeli air defense deployment. Yet Riyadh is now looking toward the same Israeli capabilities that the UAE relied upon earlier in the war. That change is taking place as Saudi Arabia’s own military and energy problems become harder to contain.
Saudi Oil Infrastructure Is Taking Repeated Hits
Saudi Arabia’s search for military assistance cannot be separated from the damage hitting its energy system. The kingdom’s 400,000 barrel per day Jizan refinery has faced repeated attacks, and oil storage and distribution facilities in southern Saudi Arabia have also been hit. Tankers and other infrastructure near the Red Sea have faced growing danger. The attacks are spreading across facilities that Saudi Arabia needs to produce, process and export energy. (OilPrice.com, September 15, 2026; Reuters, September 11, 2026)
On September 8, the Houthis launched missiles and drones at targets in Abha, Najran, Jizan and Khamis Mushait. Saudi authorities reported fires at energy facilities and said more than 70 people were wounded. Satellite imagery showed smoke rising from Saudi oil installations. The attacks represented one of the largest Houthi strikes on Saudi territory during the current regional conflict. (Reuters via The Jerusalem Post, September 8, 2026)
The East West Pipeline then suffered a larger economic blow. The 1,200 kilometer system carries crude from Saudi Arabia’s eastern producing regions across the country to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia built the route partly to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. That purpose became far more important after the war with Iran sharply reduced normal tanker traffic through the Gulf. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Al Jazeera, September 14, 2026)
Saudi Arabia responded to the disruption in Hormuz by sending more crude west across the desert. Oil reaching Yanbu could move toward international markets without passing through the Persian Gulf chokepoint. The pipeline became one of the kingdom’s most important defenses against the disruption of Hormuz. Drones then struck its pumping infrastructure, forcing Saudi Arabia to shut the system. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026)
Regional officials cited by the Associated Press said repairs could take three to five weeks, with the possibility of an earlier partial restart. The system can carry as much as 7 million barrels per day, though actual flows have been lower. Rystad Energy estimated that roughly 2.6 million to 4 million barrels per day had recently moved through the pipeline and out through the Red Sea. At the high end, that volume represents about 4 percent of world oil supply. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026)
Saudi Arabia can rely on stored crude near Yanbu for a limited period, but storage does not replace a working pipeline. Industry estimates cited in the reporting put the available buffer at roughly five to eight days at recent export rates. Additional Saudi crude stored at Egyptian terminals provides another short term option, but those supplies cannot fully replace normal pipeline flows. A shutdown lasting weeks would put greater pressure on Saudi exports and production. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Al Jazeera, September 14, 2026)
The pressure is already visible in Saudi supply figures. The International Energy Agency estimated that Saudi crude supply fell by 2.3 million barrels per day in August to about 6 million barrels per day, the lowest level in more than three decades. Saudi crude loadings also fell by about 1.1 million barrels per day during the month to roughly 3.5 million barrels per day. These declines occurred before the full impact of the latest pipeline shutdown could move through the market. (Reuters, September 11, 2026)
The Escape Route From Hormuz Has Its Own Chokepoint
Saudi Arabia’s problem is now shaped by geography. The Strait of Hormuz sits to the east, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. The Bab el Mandeb Strait sits beyond Saudi Arabia’s western coast at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The East West Pipeline connects the kingdom’s eastern oil fields with the western route, allowing Saudi crude to bypass Hormuz when Gulf shipping becomes dangerous.
That system worked only if the western route remained secure. Houthi forces have now captured Mokha and Perim Island, which sits inside Bab el Mandeb, giving them a stronger position around the shipping lane. The Houthis have also threatened Saudi vessels and energy infrastructure along the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is therefore facing pressure against the route it increasingly relied upon to escape the problems in Hormuz. (Ynet News, September 15, 2026; The Washington Post, September 2026)
About 8.7 percent of global seaborne trade passes through Bab el Mandeb, according to United Nations figures cited by The Washington Post. The traffic includes major shares of container shipping, oil products and crude. A serious disruption there would affect far more than Saudi Arabia because ships moving between Europe and Asia could be forced around the Cape of Good Hope. That detour adds time, fuel expenses and shipping costs. (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Dennis Citrinowicz, an Iran expert at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former Israeli military intelligence analyst, called the Houthi advance “a major, almost unprecedented, strategic achievement for Iran and the Houthis.” He said, “At precisely the moment when Tehran is trying to drive up the economic cost of its confrontation with the United States, the Houthi advance gives Iran enormous additional leverage.” (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Saudi Arabia is not completely cut off from global markets. Crude reaching Yanbu can travel north through the Red Sea toward Egypt and the Mediterranean, and limited tanker traffic continues through Hormuz. The problem is that every remaining route now carries greater risk or depends on infrastructure that has already been attacked. Saudi Arabia has options, but fewer of them look dependable.
Salvatore Mercogliano, a professor of maritime history at Campbell University, described the danger if those options narrow further. “If this (East-West pipeline) was the only method for Saudi Arabia to get their oil out it would be absolutely cataclysmic,” he said. Mercogliano also stressed that some Hormuz traffic has resumed, saying, “But since the Hormuz route has opened back up, not completely but opened up some, it’s not the death knell for Saudi Arabia. They’re getting oil out.” (Associated Press, September 15, 2026)
Years of War Did Not Remove the Houthi Threat
Saudi Arabia has spent more than a decade trying to defeat or contain the Houthis. Riyadh led a military coalition into Yemen in 2015 after the group seized much of the country, including the capital. Years of airstrikes and fighting followed before a 2022 truce reduced the intensity of the conflict. The pause gave Saudi Arabia several years of relative calm along its southern border. (Associated Press; Reuters via The Jerusalem Post, September 8, 2026)
That calm has broken down. Houthi forces are again hitting Saudi cities, military bases and oil infrastructure, and Saudi backed Yemeni forces have returned to major offensive operations. Saudi Arabia has answered with new airstrikes in Yemen. The same movement Riyadh spent years trying to weaken is now holding stronger positions around the Red Sea and striking infrastructure inside the kingdom. (Reuters via The Jerusalem Post, September 8, 2026)
Maj. Gen. Turki al Malki, spokesperson for the Saudi led coalition, promised another forceful response. “The coalition will take all necessary operational measures to deter this terrorist militia and resolutely confront its hostile approach,” he said. The statement signals another military effort against a movement that survived years of Saudi air power and emerged from the earlier war still capable of threatening the kingdom. (Reuters via The Jerusalem Post, September 8, 2026)
Saudi Arabia’s earlier intervention also carried an enormous human cost in Yemen. A United Nations Development Programme estimate put deaths connected directly and indirectly to the conflict at 377,000 by the end of 2021. Hunger, disease and damage to public services accounted for a large part of that total. The return of major fighting now raises the risk of another destructive cycle without a clear political settlement in sight. (United Nations Development Programme)
Washington Coordinates the Network but Avoids Another Front
The United States is trying to help Saudi Arabia without opening another large American military campaign against the Houthis. Ynet reported that Trump rejected Mohammed bin Salman’s request for U.S. strikes but agreed that Washington would provide intelligence and assistance identifying targets. CENTCOM is also facilitating Saudi contacts with Israel and bringing Israeli and Arab military leaders into the same regional security structure. (Ynet News, September 15, 2026; Axios, September 15, 2026)
Trump later described contacts with the Houthis by saying, “the Houthis called us” and “they don’t want to fight with us.” His comments pointed to the administration’s effort to avoid another direct confrontation in Yemen as American forces remain engaged against Iran. That approach has not removed Washington from the conflict around Saudi Arabia. It has shifted more of the American role toward intelligence, military coordination and support for regional partners. (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Saudi Arabia is also positioned to receive more American weaponry. The Trump administration notified Congress of a possible $5 billion sale containing 5,004 BLU 111 500 pound bombs, 5,000 BLU 117 2,000 pound bombs and 10,004 extended range JDAM guidance kits. The proposed transfer had not become a finalized contract at the time of the notification. The package comes as Saudi Arabia has resumed strikes in Yemen and asks foreign partners for more help against the Houthis. (U.S. arms sale reporting provided in source material)
The arrangement exposes an uncomfortable contradiction in the regional strategy. Washington is seeking to keep American forces from another major Houthi campaign, yet American intelligence, weapons and military command structures remain central to the response. Israel is becoming more deeply integrated into the same system. Saudi Arabia, after years of spending heavily on its own defense, is again turning to outside powers as attacks reach deeper into the kingdom.
The Global Energy Market Is Losing Its Safety Valves
Saudi Arabia’s problems extend far beyond its borders because the country remains one of the largest sources of crude available to world markets. The East West Pipeline was moving millions of barrels each day that would otherwise have faced the dangers around Hormuz. Its shutdown removes supply from a market already coping with reduced Gulf traffic, refinery damage and falling inventories. Another major Saudi disruption would leave buyers competing for fewer replacement barrels. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Reuters, September 11, 2026)
Oil prices are already reflecting that pressure. Brent crude traded above $105 per barrel after the latest disruptions, and other reporting put prices above $109 during periods of heavier market concern. The difference between daily prices matters less than the direction: energy traders are placing a higher price on the risk surrounding Saudi infrastructure and Middle Eastern shipping. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Institute for Energy Research, September 2026)
The damage is also moving into retail fuel markets. The Associated Press reported U.S. regular gasoline near $4.32 per gallon and diesel around $6.23 per gallon. Import dependent countries in Asia and Africa have recorded far larger increases from prewar prices. Diesel creates a broad economic problem because trucks, farm machinery, construction equipment and freight networks consume it every day. Higher fuel expenses move into transportation, agriculture and eventually the prices paid by households. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026)
Rob Haworth, a strategist at U.S. Bank, captured the problem in a single sentence: “energy supplies are highly vulnerable, whether it’s by sea or by pipeline.” That vulnerability is becoming more dangerous because several energy routes are under pressure at the same time. The market is losing the ability to shift easily from one route to another whenever an attack shuts down part of the system. (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Hormuz once carried about 20 million barrels of oil each day before the war. Saudi Arabia built Petroline as protection against disruption there, and the Red Sea offered another route to international buyers. Storage could absorb temporary outages, and strategic reserves gave governments another buffer. The current conflict is testing several of those protections at once rather than allowing one to compensate cleanly for another. (Associated Press, September 15, 2026; Al Jazeera, September 14, 2026)
Iran Gains Leverage Without Stopping Every Barrel
Iran and its regional partners do not need to stop every Saudi tanker to create serious economic damage. Repeated attacks can force shipping companies to change routes, increase insurance costs and delay cargoes. Damage to pipelines or refineries can reduce the amount of crude and fuel reaching the market before any formal blockade occurs. Even the threat of another strike forces traders and governments to price more risk into energy.
Sima Shine, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and former head of analysis at Mossad, said recent events showed greater coordination among Iran aligned forces. “It’s much more coordinated between the Iranians and the Iraqi militias and the Houthis,” she said. Her assessment does not establish that Tehran directly ordered each attack, but it reflects growing concern that pressure from Yemen, Iraq and Iran is hitting Saudi Arabia from several directions at once. (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Saudi Arabia is caught inside that pressure. Its eastern shipping route remains dangerous, its cross country pipeline has been damaged, its western energy infrastructure faces attacks and Houthi forces have improved their position around the southern Red Sea. Riyadh can repair facilities, purchase more weapons and obtain Israeli intelligence. None of those actions quickly restores the low risk energy system the kingdom relied upon before the regional war.
Saudi Arabia Is Running Out of Comfortable Choices
Saudi Arabia still possesses enormous oil reserves, financial resources, military equipment and powerful foreign partners. The kingdom is not facing the disappearance of its energy industry, and limited exports continue through several routes. What has changed is the assumption that Saudi crude can always reach world markets through a dependable alternative when another route fails. The attacks have exposed how many of those alternatives can be threatened at the same time.
Riyadh built an oil pipeline to escape the risks surrounding Hormuz, and that pipeline has now been attacked. Saudi Arabia spent years fighting the Houthis, yet the group now holds territory near one of the world’s busiest shipping routes and can strike Saudi energy facilities. The kingdom kept formal relations with Israel at a distance, yet Saudi officials are now seeking Israeli intelligence through CENTCOM. Each development shows a government with fewer comfortable choices than its wealth and military spending once suggested.
Israel is gaining a larger military role in Gulf security without a formal Saudi normalization agreement. The United States is trying to avoid another direct campaign at the same time its military structure holds much of the regional response together. Saudi Arabia is again dependent on foreign military assistance as attacks reach the infrastructure that connects its oil fields with world markets. The arrangement may contain individual threats, but it has not yet produced a path out of the wider conflict.
Dennis Citrinowicz said the problem extends far beyond another Houthi battlefield gain. “What makes this particularly serious is that there is no obvious solution on the horizon, military or economic,” he said. Citrinowicz added, “This is not simply another Houthi battlefield victory in Yemen. It fundamentally changes Iran’s leverage in its confrontation with the United States and places much greater pressure on the global energy system.” (The Washington Post, September 2026)
Saudi Arabia’s oil network was built around backup routes that were supposed to keep crude moving when one part of the system failed. The war is now hitting those backup routes themselves, leaving Riyadh more dependent on foreign security assistance as its ability to move oil becomes harder to protect. For the global energy market, the danger is no longer one damaged refinery or one closed pipeline. It is the possibility that a system built with several escape routes is running out of safe places to turn.
